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Abstract
Different approaches to conflict resolution and peacekeeping in African failed
states have taken the centre stage of this analysis. These approaches are based not
merely on theory or doctrine but on the self-perceived interests of the stakeholders
in peacekeeping inside Africa. The Western powers have repeatedly expressed the
view that they will not commit their armed forces to resolve African conflicts.
The West's desire to place responsibility on African states, rather than sharing it,
will not bring peace in Africa. The reason is that Africans are not ready to shoulder
such heavy responsibility without direct Western military involvement in African
conflicts. Building Africa's own capacity will take long time, while Africa is
desperate for peacekeepers now. Nigeria tried to fill the gap in need of
peacekeepers in its region without doctrinal and practical readiness to conduct
modem peacekeeping.

Peace Keeping: Theory and Practice
Peacekeeping refers to a direct deployment of a UN presence in the
field. Hitherto, practice has been to have the consent of all the parties
concerned although as later discussion will make clear, present, and
future practice is likely to diverge from this. Deployments involve
UN military and/or police personnel and frequently (indeed
increasingly) civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that the
possibilities for the prevention of conflict as well as the making of
peace. 1 This means that the peacekeepers are invited after a ceasefire has been signed. The peacekeepers are armed with light
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weapons only. Their task is to physically separate the conflicting
parties and monitor their adherence to the cease-fire while
negotiations for peace takes place. 2 However, the practice of
peacekeeping has been expanded to use increasing force to maintain
the peacekeepers' position in the event of the conflicting parties
resorting to forceful means again.
The UN peacekeeping operations are divided into traditional and
modem peacekeeping practices. Traditional peacekeeping refers to
the UN peacekeeping operations during the course of the Cold War
(1948-1989), whereas modem peacekeeping has been in effect
during the post-Cold War period (1990-present).
Under traditional peacekeeping, the UN peacekeepers typically
served two functions: (1) observing the peace (monitoring and
reporting on the maintenance of cease-fires) and (2) s parating
warring armies by establishing a buffer zone.3 The
took on its
first peacekeeping mission in June 1948 after the end of the first
Arab-Israeli war. In that case, the UN deployed its observer mission,
the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), to monitor
cease-fire, truce, and armistice agreements in disputed areas. The
UN strictly implemented principles of consent, impartiality, and
non- or minimum use of force as a base for any of its traditional
peacekeeping operations.
Consent means establishing agreement with a disputing party or
parties and/or being licensed or given approval to intervene by a
party or parties directly involved in the conflict. The rationale
behind consent was that the belligerent parties would commit
themselves to co-operate with the third party, the UN, to bring about
a lasting solution to an already existing source of friction. This
would allow more freedom and legitimacy to the UN in
implementing its peacekeeping mandate.
Impartiality means being independent and not taking sides. It is
a key element in intervention. Tharoor points out the following:
Impartiality is the oxygen of peacekeeping: the only way peacekeepers
can work is by being trusted by both sides, being clear and transparent in
2. Urquhart, B. (1990) ' Beyond the Sheriff's posses' Survival Vol. 32 (3) p.
198
3. Anthony Parsons et al., "The United Nations after the Gulf War,"
http://httpweb12.epnet.com.
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their dealings, and keeping lines of communication open. The moment
they lose this trust, the moment they are seen by one side as the "enemy,"
they become part of the problem they were sent to solve.4

This means that before landing on the soil of the troubled
territory, the third party, which is involved as a peacekeeper, should
have to make clear the basis of its interventionist agenda
beforehand. It should persuade all contenders with regard to its
impartiality and the duration of the operation, and it should have its
identity or the mark of its own peacekeeping force (e.g., operating
under the UN flag and with blue helmets to avoid confusion among
the warring parties). Proving its impartiality to the warring parties is
needed to maintain trust and confidence at every step taken during
the operation.
On the other hand, the warring parties should also prove their
acceptance of the third party by signing protocols and committing
to terms of agreement in order for the peacekeepers to feel
legitimized and to move freely to achieve the ultimate goal of peace.
Therefore, to keep the peacekeeping mission alive, a genuine
position of impartiality on the peacekeeper's side is needed.
Equally, the commitment of the conflicting parties to agreement
concerning the impartiality of the peacekeeping force is also an
essential factor.
The impartiality of the UN force may be challenged in situations
where a local dispute has cross-border implications or international
dimensions. Belligerents might suspect the involvement of
contingents from certain countries in multinational peacekeeping
operations to be partial or partisan. For instance, the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) has not included military or civilian personnel from the
Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) neighbouring countries,
especially those that have embroiled themselves by siding with one
of the conflicting parties. 5 Therefore, in a case like this, it is
mandatory for the UN to consult the conflicting parties before
recruiting troops from contributing countries. In most cases during
4. Shashi Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go to Basics," Survival 37, no.
4 (1995-1996): 58.

5. Mark Malan, "Keeping the Peace in Africa: A Renaissance Role for South
Africa," Indicator South Africa 15, no. 2 (1998): 19-20.
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the Cold War interventions, the UN developed a practice of avoiding
using troops from the five permanent members of the Security
Council (especially China and the two superpowers) and forces from
neighbouring countries. 6 The advantages of these practices were
obvious; local conflicts were insulated from both Cold War and
regional rivalry. 7 The possible disadvantage is that by doing so, the
forces from the UN sometimes lacked the authority and strength of
the superpowers, or alternatively they lacked the local knowledge,
interest, and staying power that a neighbouring power might have
had. 8
The UN' s principle of non-use of force was first implemented
during the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In this
case, the observer missions were deployed unarmed. The UN
mission was deployed by consent among the warring parties and was
accepted by both parties as a neutral body. Hence, the alreadyestablished solid agreement between the UN and the belligerents,
based on the principles of consent and impartiality, could help to
build confidence and trust on the side of the UN missions to
participate unarmed. This means that the principle of non-use of
arms is valid as long as the protagonists are committed to the
original terms of agreements throughout the UN presence.
Otherwise, in case of a change of mind by a party or parties involved
in the conflict (e.g., due to sudden escalation of uncertainty that
questions the entire presence of the UN force), the threat of collapse
and disaster would be very real. For instance, the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMSIL) has faced attack from the
rebels, 9 and the termination of the UN Mission in Angola in
February 1999 came after both the government and the rebel
movement repeatedly flouted the various peace agreements they
signed. 10Most recently, UN forces were under fire in the DRC and
faced a threat to withdraw from the Ivory Coast. Therefore, to
6 . Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," Survival 35, no. 3
(1994): 95.
7. Ibid.
8 . Ibid.
9. "Attack on UN Force in Sierra Leone Has Broader Impact," AP
Worldstream (April 5, 2000).
10. Eric Berman et al., "The Limitations of Regional Peacekeeping,"
Peacekeeping and International Relations 28, no. 4 (1999): 2.
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minimize risk and safeguard the lives of its forces, the UN amended
the principle of non-use of force to allow the use of light arms in
self-defence only. 11
The minimum use of force was first applied when the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was deployed in the Suez Canal
crisis in November 1956. With regard to this new addition to
doctrine, the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold,
asserted,
Where the rule is applied men engaged in the operation may never take
the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with
force to an attack with arms, including attempts to make them withdraw
from positions which they occupy under orders from the commander,
acting under the authority of the Assembly and within the scope of its
resolutions. 12

From then until the end of the Cold War era in 1989, the UN has
continued to apply the principle of use of force for the purpose of
self-defence only. The use of force by the UN has caused debate
ever since the organization's earliest days. Some argue that the use
of force is unnecessary and irrelevant and justify this by saying that
it means violating the principle of consent by questioning the
impartial position of the UN force. Rather than risk clashes between
the UN force and the party or parties, the UN should look for
peaceful ways of resolving differences as more preferable and
appropriate than seeking military solution. Such authorities
advocate the non-use of force as more consistent with the consent
reached with all parties to the UN involvement. Some believe that
the differences between peacekeepers and parties involved should
be resolved amicably so the use of force would be both unnecessary
and counterproductive- in the sense Lhat the use of force against a
particuJar party would abrogate the principle of impartiality. 13
Others support the use of a significant degree of force beyond
self-defence to maintain law and order wherever necessary. UN
forces need to be flexible to handle changing conflict issues and
11. United Nations, UN General Assembly Document A/3943, par. 178.
12. Ibid.
13. F. T. Lui, "United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-use of Force,"
International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (1992): 11-12.
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environments. Sometimes the performance of the original mandate
has led to additional tasks that were not in accord with the golden
principles and practices of peacekeeping outlined above. 14 One
example of this is the UN mission in the Congo, the United Nations
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in February 1961. Initially it was
established to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the
government in maintaining law and order, and to provide technical
assistance. However, following the murder of Congolese Prime
Minister Lumumba, the function of ONUC was subsequently
modified to include more use of coercive measures to maintain the
territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, thus
preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal
from the Congo of all foreign military and mercenaries prompting
the breakaway of the country. 15
The UN faced military attack while fulfilling its mission in the
Congo and could only manage to maintain peace and order in the
Congo by using more coercive measures. In others, as in Somalia, it
undertook coercive measures with less positive results. However, in
post-Cold War intervention, there has been a consensus among
academics, policy analysts, and politicians that the traditional
peacekeeping operations should still be the model wherever it is
applicable. For example, in its post-Cold War interventions like
those in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, the UN
gained successes by applying its traditional principles of monitoring
the peacefu] settlement agreed to by the actors in the conflict. l 6
Nonetheless, to respond to the changing nature of conflict, the UN
has to add new ingredients to classical peacekeeping doctrines to
meet the new kinds of conflict in the post-Cold War world.

14. Mark Malan, "A Concise Conceptual History of UN Peace Operations,"
African Security Review 6, no. I (1997): 20-2 I.
15. Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the Security Council
(Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1998), 486-487.
16. Mohamed Sahnoun, "Managing Conflict after the Cold War," Peace
Review 8, no. 4 (1996): 9.
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Modern Peace Keeping: Reasons for New Approaches
The UN's post-Cold War intervention is labelled as modem
peacekeeping. In this context, the nature of intervention has changed
along with dramatic changes in the nature of conflicts. Most of the
conflicts during this period have been intra-state. This has made it
difficult for the UN to mount peacekeeping operations using its
restricted principles of Cold War intervention. Applying consent,
impartiality, and minimum use of force as preconditions for
intervention became difficult in a new situation no matter how well
they had served during the Cold War. Intervention can now be
mounted without the consent of the warring parties, involving
greater force than used to be the case. The post-Cold War conflicts
brought the so called failed or collapsed states to prominence in the
international system. The UN had little experience in dealing with
such deadly civil wars that caused total state emergencies. The
dramatic changes in the nature of conflict, most of which are now
intra-state, made it difficult to apply the restricted principles of UN
intervention in the aftermath of the Cold War. The post-Cold War
period has witnessed the emergence of the problem of so-called
failed states where the state apparatus has totally collapsed, and
lawlessness has taken over as the result of vicious civil wars. The
deadly civil wars and famine claimed the lives of thousands of
millions as witnessed in Somalia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and
Darfur in Sudan.
The UN Cold War doctrines of consent, impartiality, and
minimum use of force became difficult to apply under the new
circumstances no matter how well they had served in the past. It is
difficult to secure consent and impartiality in the absence of
legitimate government within failed states and when dozens of
factions are involved in civil war. This means intervention has to be
conducted in situations where conflict has not been terminated and
consent has not been reached with the conflicting parties at the time
of international deployment. This involves eroding the wall of
traditional sovereignty in the absence of a functioning state and
central government as a necessary thing to enforce peace, contain
the disaster of the civil war on civilian populations, and make a way
for humanitarian assistance. This means more coercive action

76

The Journal ofAfrican Policy Studies Voume 26, No. 1, 2020

should be taken against those who have broken agreements to spur
on the dispute. 17 Indeed, the legitimacy of the instigation of the
mission derives from the authority of the UN and Security Council
resolution and le s from the consent of the conflicting partie . 18
Unlike the traditional peacekeeping practice where the peacekeepers
are following a strategic agenda agreed to by the parties, the
peacekeepers are now enforcing the UN Security Council mandates.
Arguably, the legal base of post-Cold War peacekeeping action is
potentially more fragile than a traditional peacekeeping operation
because it is based on a less robust environment of consent and the
initiatives stem more from international powers than from
conflicting parties themselves. 19
Considering such circumstances, the UN should not be bound by
its principle of non-violability of the sovereignty of states as stated
in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which reads "nothing contained in
the present charter shall authorize the international body to intervene
in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state." As Helman and Ramer point out, in the cases of failed
states, the "traditional view of sovereignty has so decayed that all
should recognize the appropriateness of th UN measures inside
member states to save th m from self-destruction." 20 In bis General
Assembly speech (1999), former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
strongly a serted that the UN should take responsibility to protect
civilian victims of internal aimed conflicts. 21
Hence, the concept of responsibility to protect (RtoP) has been
endorsed by the United Nations since 2005 to allow the UN to
intervene to rescue civilians amid internal armed conflicts. In
response, the UN has adopted a new mandate of greater use of
military intervention called "forceful humanitarian intervention,"
17. Christopher Dandeker et al., "The Future of Peace Support Operations:
Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 3 (1997):
24-25.
18 . Ibid., 29.
19. Ibid., 29-30.
20 . Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of
United Nations Peace Building, Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995):
392.
21. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan Speech to the General
Assembly, 1999.
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which is designed to limit the effects of a conflict and assist in
creating the conditions for its termination and humanitarian aid. 22
Although the new model of intervention equally considers
application of the issue of consent wherever possible, it places much
less weight when the conflicting parties choose not to yield to their
original terms of agreement. The new practice of UN peacekeeping
requires the use of increasing force to protect civilian victims and to
maintain its position in the event conflicting parties launch an attack
against the UN force. Therefore, the RtoP should be further justified
with doctrinal establishment as a new principle of intervention in the
reformed UN structure.
While flexibility over sovereignty may seem like a common
sense approach to problems of humanitarian crisis and intervention
in a world defined by powerful self-interested nations with political
and economic agendas, it is all too easy to see the pressures that
could be brought to bear on the UN in defining individual occasions
when sovereignty may or may not be set aside. While the issue of
sovereignty remains sensitive, one may argue that humanitarianmotivated intervention may face as much armed resistance and
opposition from the conflicting parties as a peacekeeping force
having political, economic, or geo-strategic motives. For example,
the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992 was largely humanitarian
driven, but upon arrival of the U.S. forces, Somali warring factions
stopped fighting each other and turned their attacks against the U.S.
forces.
The idea and practice of developing a greater military dimension
under the new peacekeeping model has faced critical debate and
opposition from the advocates of traditional limits to peacekeeping
activities. They argue that significant use of force has no place in
UN actions because using force means losing consent, an essential
requirement for keeping peace. 23 They further claim that massive
use of force in Somalia by the American and by the UN brought no
success but discredited both the UN and Americans. 24 However,
considering the limitations of traditional peacekeeping to handle
massive civilian causalities also known as complex humanitarian
22 . Dandeker and others "The Future of Peace Support Operations" p. 25
23 . Ibid. 22.
24. Ibid.
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emergencies and of new manifestation of conflicts, the need of more
coercive UN peacekeeping is without doubt a necessary thing to do.
The changing nature of international conflicts in the post-Cold War
era, especially in Africa where there has been massive civilian
murder (e.g., genocide in the case of Rwanda). This further
underscores the need for more coercive and forceful military
intervention that employs modem and advanced weapons to
undertake international peacekeeping. From this perspective, the
fact is that light weapons cannot be considered sufficient to
undertake forceful humanitarian peacekeeping and the disarming of
trained and experienced African guerrilla fighters capable of
slaughtering hundreds of thousands of civilians. 25
Nevertheless, the modern model of UN peacekeeping should
also consider the traditional doctrine of peacekeeping approach like
consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force wherever
applicable. The United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia
(UNMEE) in 2000 was a recent example of UN peacekeeping based
on the old principle of peacekeeping. Therefore, the UN needs to
consider a mixture of both traditional and modem peacekeeping
approaches as needed.

Challenges to Modern Peace Keeping in Africa
The changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era has
resulted in dramatic changes in peacekeeping concepts, conduct, and
approaches. Among other things, the need for peacekeepers has
increased enormously under modem peacekeeping missions. The
UN has conducted forty-nine new peacekeeping operations since the
end of the Cold War compared to fifteen during the forty years of
Cold War peacekeeping operations. 26 The UN has undertaken more
of its peacekeeping missions in Africa than in any other part of the
world, especially in the post-Cold War era. This is due to the greater
incidence of conflict in Africa than in any other continent. From
countries in the west (Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Niger,
25 . "Debate on Vote No. 23-National Defence," Debate of the
National Assembly (June 21 , 1995): 3123.
26 . United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml.
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Mali and Liberia) to those in the east (Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan), and even countries in the centre
of the continent (Central Africa Republic, Chad, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville), Angola in the south and
Libya in the North, Africa has been ravaged by brutal wars. Africa
has been a serious testing ground for UN international peacekeeping
missions. Failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Angola
(1999), Sierra Leone (2000), and UN peacekeeping forces' most
recent struggles in the Sudan and DRC have challenged the direction
and traditional working mechanisms of UN peacekeeping missions.
The rise in the need for peacekeepers under modem
peacekeeping policies involves more financial and human cost to the
UN. Since 1999 the UN missions employed more than 124,000
personnel compared to only 10,000 before 1987. 27 The UN
peacekeepjng cost for 2010 is $7.9 billion while before 1990 the
figure was only $400 million. 28 Modern peacekeeping has also
added new peacekeeping ingredients, including short-term actions
of using coercive military interventions and humanitarian
intervention and a long-term agenda of peace building in the postconflict environment. Undoubtedly, the new mandate poses serious
resource limitations in terms of finance and trained personnel.
Peace building is a contemporary adaptation and extension of
multilateral concerns and the indivisibility of peace. It involves
actions targeting building the state, political, economic, and legal
conditions to solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
In attempting to consolidate peace, peace building involves the
following: 29
I.

Military and security activities such as disarmament, demobilization
of combatants, and destruction of arms as well as reintegration of
forces and demining.

2 7. United Nations, http://www. un. org/en/peacekeeping/documents/
s/factsheet.
28. Greg Mills, "South Africa and Peacekeeping," South African Yearbook of
International Affairs (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of
International Affairs, 1996), 214.
29. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. (New York: United
Nations, 1992), 11-19.
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Humanitarian activities, including repatriation and resettlement of
refugees, along with infrastructural activities such as building
houses and health and education institutions.
3. Political action such as fostering good-governance, institutional
reforms, election monitoring, the promotion of respect for human
rights, the reform of judiciary and police, and the investigation of
crime.
4 . Economic and social activities involving the reconstruction ofwartorn economies, major infrastructural development-which may be
carried out by UN organs such as the UNDP with the help of
international financial institutions such as the World Bank-the
IMF and international donor communities.

The number of role players in post-Cold War peacekeeping
efforts has also significantly increased. Regional bodies including
the African Union (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community
(SADC) have become prominent. Western powers also conducted
peacekeeping on their own national account. The U.S. intervention
in Somalia ( 1992), France in Ivory Coast (2001 ), and Britain in
Serra Leone ( 1999) provide examples of this.
The involvement of a number of role players in post-Cold War
peacekeeping have inevitably evoked the problem of unclear
mandate, command and control issues, and clashes of interest
among stakeholders especially in connection with new tasks of the
so-called humanitarian intervention, which were undertaken in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Such confusions led in all cases to
the withdrawal of the interventionist force. In the former
Yugoslavia, NATO exceeded the political-legal authority granted to
it by the UN. SADC intervened in the 1998 Lesotho crisis without
the authorization and control of the UN Security Council. The UN
secretary-general reported that, while the undertaking of parallel
operations by E OW AS and the UN in Liberia broke fresh ground
in p acekeeping finding a joint concept of operation was not easy. 30
Each one of the role players has its own principles of peacekeeping
and agenda for involvement. In some cases, it was not clear what the
missions of the peacekeepers-whether to restore peace or to deliver
30. United Nations, Eleventh Progress Report ofthe Secretary-General ofthe
United Nations Observer Missions in Liberia, Sil 995/473 (June 10, 1995).
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humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, peacekeeping in Africa
whether undertaken by western-led bodies or Africans themselves
has been understood as motivated to satisfy the political interest on
interventionists rather than identified as purely humanitarian driven
intervention. For example, ECOMOG (Liberia and Sierra Leone)
and SADC (Lesotho and DRC) interventions in their respective subregions have been understood as having an, 'overtly political
objective (regional stability and economic interest) as a rationale for
intervention'. 31 This is peacekeeping calculated on national interest,
rather than on humanitarian grounds. It has been argued that
humanitarian intervention should form part of the new international
order. 32 The late UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan introduced the
concept of 'universal humanitarianism' when he noted that" ... ifthe
new commitment to humanitarian action is to retain the support of
the world s people, it must be univ rsal, irrespective of region or
nation. Humanity after all, is indivis:ible. 33 Annan furtbe1· warned
that, " ... This world has changed in profound ways since the Cold
War, but I fear our conceptions of national interest have failed to
follow suit." 34 The US policy of non-intervention where there is no
American national interest, after its failure in Somalia, can be taken
as another case in point.
Needless to say that the confusions surrounding the mandate of
modem peacekeeping and the dramatic change of conflict in socalled failed states in the post- cold war era and the United Nations
own doctrinal limitations and limited practical experience in modem
peacekeeping make peacekeeping missions far from smooth.
The UN's sole experience in dealing with deadly civil wars and
collapsed states was in the isolated case of the Congo as far back as
the early 1960s in a different context than the Cold War. In dealing
with these new developments, the UN has suffered from doctrinal
restrictions. For example, Article 2(7) of its charter states that the
31. Malan M. (2000) 'Peace Support Operations in Africa: The Unresolved
Issues' ISS series no. 44 p.170
32. Robert A. (1996) 'Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and
Impartiality in a policy vacuum, Adelphi Paper, IISS studies 305 p. 19
33 Annan, K. 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty' The Economist 18 September
1999.
34 Ibid.
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UN should not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state. Despite this limitation, UN forces have
intervened in zones of conflict without invitation to save the civilian
victims. The UN intervention in Somalia (1993-1994) is a case in
point. In response to new kinds of conflict, the UN has also added
new ingredients to its post-Cold War peacekeeping profile. Among
these are forceful humanitarian intervention, post-conflict state
reconstruction, and treating the issue of sovereignty as being more
flexible and picking up the rarely-used Article 53 of its charter (on
partnership with regional and sub-regional bodies) to seek for
collaborative efforts and common approach in addressing conflicts.
Under the evolving model of international and regional security
initiative of humanitarian intervention, states should adopt their
peacekeeping policies with conviction that peacekeeping has to be
motivated by humanitarian reason rather than their national interest.
Therefore, states should show the highest level of political
willingness and resource commitment to make the idea of
humanitarian intervention work under modern peacekeeping
practices.

Modern Peacekeeping in Africa
As part of their vision to help Africa help itself, the West has put
pressure on African states and regional bodies to take up more
responsibility in peacekeeping. In response to this call, African
Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations have
undertaken doctrinal and structural changes towards taking care of
their own regional security problems.
The pressing insecurity issues in their respective sub-regions
have forced African regional institutions to take up the new mandate
of dealing with conflict resolution and peacekeeping. To this end,
they have begun to develop capacities for regional conflict
resolutions through national and sub-regional level trainings,
seminars, and workshops. A part of their region-al security capacity
building is creating an African Standby Force (ASF) within each
sub-region under the direct command of African Peace and Security
Council (PSC). However, the urgent need for regional intervention
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pressed them to act before they built competent mechanisms of
regional peacekeeping and conflict resolutions. As the case of is
ECO WAS' s peacekeeping operations in the 1990s in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Guinea, peacekeeping operations were conducted
without doctrinal arrangements. In all cases, ECOWAS undertook
peacekeeping operations on an ad hoc basis, without following
specific sub-regional peacekeeping procedure. For example, the
ECOWAS heads of states and governments did not formally
approve the intervention of its force known as the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
force until some three months after its intervention in Sierra Leone.
Nigeria played a significant role in leading Africa's own
solution to address continental security problems. Nigeria's own
interest to see a stable and peaceful continent to protect itself from
direct cross-border incursions and refugee crisis as well as to attract
foreign investment to the region can be a push factor for its
involvement in peacekeeping in the continent. On the other hand,
the unconditional military disengagement of Western states from
African conflicts can be a pull factor for Nigeria's involvement in
regional peacekeeping. Conflicts in West Africa have exposed
Nigeria to the need and opportunity to test its capacity to deal with
regional security matters.
Therefore, Nigeria has indulged in regional peace support
operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone without any preparatory
groundwork in doctrine and practice of peacekeeping because of the
urgent need for an interventionist force to forestall a horrific human
catastrophe. However, Nigeria did not have breathing space to
formulate a policy on conducting regional peacekeeping and
trainings to prepare its national peacekeeping force.
Nigeria involved itself in the Liberian conflict in August 1990
by mediating between various warring factions within the
framework of the Economic Commission for West African States
(ECOWAS). Nigeria initially acted together with ECOWAS
member states, operating under the so-called ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee. At the time, this was composed of Gambia,
Ghana, Mali, and Togo. When political and diplomatic efforts did
not bear fruit, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee
immediately established the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) for quick deployment to ward off civilian disaster and
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suffering in Liberia. The initial commitment was a force of 2,500
drawn from these countries, rising to 14,000 troops in 1992. 35
Nigeria contributed 70% of the total ECOMOG troop contribution
and provided 80% of ECOMOG mission costs, which were
estimated at about $3 billion. 36 Nigeria also took over political and
military leadership of the ECOMOG force in Liberia.
A Nigerian led ECOMOG coalition force also intervened in
Sierra Leone to restore the democratically elected government of
Ahmed Kabbah, which was removed by a coup led by Major Johnny
Koroma in 1997. However, critics of Nigerian policy argue that its
military regime under Sani Abacha was not grounded on any of
Nigeria's own domestic and foreign policy realities. Intervention on
the grounds of good governance and human rights by an
authoritarian state with one of the worst contemporary human rights
records is simply not credible.
The Nigerian-led ECOMOG operations can be considered
successful in some respects but not in others. They were successful
in terms of immediate and short-term solutions. In Liberia, an
unbearable humanitarian crisis along the lines of Rwanda was
prevented. The intervention also prepared the ground for political
negotiations among the conflicting parties after the signing of a
cease-fire agreement that led to the successful 1997 multiparty
election. 37 In these senses, ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and
Sierra Leone represented a partly successful new departure in orderkeeping in Africa.
However, perhaps predictably, this new departure suffered from
numerous shortcomings. There was no clear entry and exit
intervention strategy. There were no already-established procedures
and principles. The Nigerian-led coalition force lacked maps,
intelligence reports, and communications to and from the mission
areas both in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which resulted in problem of
command and control. In addition, Nigeria's leadership was
contested by West African francophone countries like Senegal and
Cote d'Ivoire because of cultural differences. Among the common
35. Olonisakin, F. (1998) 'The Role of Nigeria in ECOWAS Peace Support
Operation and Some Lessons for South Africa' Occasional Paper No. 6, Institute
for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, p. 6
36. Ibid, p.6
37. Ibid, pp. 7-8
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cultural problems were misunderstanding arising from the lack of
common language and differences in training and doctrine of
peacekeeping among them which contributed to suspicion and
frustration. 38
Among
the
Anglophone
countries
themselves,
misunderstanding was also evident. For example, as Olonisakin
argues, countries like Ghana, whose army specializes in
peacekeeping, found it difficult to conduct enforcement operations.
The Nigerian contingent, which was more of a specialized force for
peace enforcement or outright combat, was not as good as
Ghanaians at peacekeeping. 39
However, despite doctrinal, cultural, operational, and
ideological divergence among member countries, at least they all
agree that ECOWAS must handle sub-regional security problems.
Despite evident flaws in its practice of peace support operations and
leadership defects, Nigeria can still be influential in regional
peacekeeping.
Clearly, Nigeria's sacrifice in the resolution of the conflicts in
Liberia and Sierra Leone cannot be underestimated. Nigeria's
aspirations to take up a permanent position in any enlargement of
the Security Council's should be supported by African states. Troop
Contributing Countries (TCC) are now insisting that the bigger their
contribution in the field, the greater their representation in the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operation should be. In this regard,
Nigeria's self-interest would seem to lie in stepping up its
commitment to peacekeeping on the continent in all its political,
diplomatic, and military aspects. Nigeria has proven leadership
experience and involvement in peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra
Leone which qualifies it to offer a lot to the rest of African countries
to contribute to African regional peacekeeping operations within
the framework of the newly developed African Union Peace and
Security Council and within the would be reformed United Nations
structures. However, it is important to highlight the fact that the UN
needs to maintain its position of leadership as the supreme
international body for the maintenance of international peace and
order. It should do so in order to implement classical and modem
38. Ibid, p. 8,11
39. Ibid, pp. 7-8
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peacekeeping doctrines wherever applicable, including being
prepared to break down the walls of state sovereignty and help to
develop a doctrine of multicultural peacekeeping operation at
regional and national levels with a conviction that peace is
indivisible. Therefore, the world body's duties should include
helping regional bodies and states such as Nigeria frame their
peacekeeping doctrines that promote partnership in all level to help
alleviate the UN peacekeeping burden in Africa.

